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Massacres and Morality: Mass Killing in 
an Age of Civilian Immunity
Alex J. Bellamy*
AbSTRACT
The norm of civilian immunity, which holds that civilians must not be 
intentionally targeted in war or subjected to mass killing, is widely sup-
ported and considered a jus cogens principle of international law. Yet not 
only does mass killing remain a recurrent feature of world politics, but 
perpetrators sometimes avoid criticism or punishment. This article argues 
that the paradox can be explained by understanding that civilian immunity 
confronts a protracted struggle with competing ideologies, some of which 
have proven resilient, and that decisions about how to interpret the norm 
in specific cases are subject to intervening contextual variables. 
I. INTRodUCTIoN
There is an overlapping moral consensus that holds that the deliberate kill-
ing of civilians is wrong.1 Since the late 1940s, this consensus has become 
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  1. For instance, see James Turner Johnson, moraliTy & ConTemporary Warfare 168–86 (1999); 
sTephen C. neff, War and The laW of naTions: a General hisTory 191–94 (2005); World 
reliGions and norms of War (Vesselin Popovski, Gregory M. Reichberg, & Nicholas Turner 
eds., 2009). The idea of overlapping morality draws on John raWls, poliTiCal liberalism 
133–72 (1993). I use the term “civilian immunity” to distinguish it from “non-combatant 
immunity,” which generally implies only cases of armed conflict. The prohibition of 
arbitrary mass killing extends beyond armed conflict. See International Covenant on 
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embedded in international law, which prohibits the deliberate killing of 
non-combatants in armed conflict (including those of a “non-international 
character”), forbids genocide and demands that states take positive measures 
to prevent and punish it, asserts that no one may be arbitrarily deprived of 
their right to life, and bans a range of activities commonly associated with 
mass killing, such as forced displacement.2 Constructivists hold that such 
shared norms serve as “meaningful constraints” on behavior. They achieve 
this through internalization, where compliance becomes constitutive and 
habitual, or through the preference of social actors to be seen to be acting 
legitimately by other group members.3 Given that civilian immunity is widely 
considered a jus cogens norm, we should expect it to inhibit mass atrocities 
and prompt the punishment of violators with “ridicule,” “diplomatic and 
economic pressure” or coercion.4 Yet not only does mass killing remain a 
recurrent feature of world politics,5 sometimes perpetrators avoid punishment. 
This implies both that civilian immunity sometimes fails to inhibit behavior 
and that perpetrators are able to secure sufficient legitimacy. 
This article attempts to explain this paradox. It argues that actors typi-
cally seek to legitimize their behavior and will be inhibited from acting in 
ways that cannot be plausibly justified.6 Civilian immunity limits the num-
ber of plausible justifications for mass atrocities. As such, since the Second 
World War justifications have tended either to draw on one or both of only 
   Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 
Mar. 1976).
  2. Geoffrey besT, War and laW sinCe 1945 (1994); The riGhT To life in inTernaTional laW (B.G. 
Ramcharan ed., 1985); William a. sChabas, GenoCide in inTernaTional laW: The Crimes of 
Crimes (2000).
  3. Ward Thomas, eThiCs of desTruCTion: norms and forCe in inTernaTional relaTions 38 (2001). 
Ian Hurd and Alexander Wendt 1999 identify coercion, interest and belief/legitimacy as 
sources of norm compliance. See Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International 
Politics, 53 inT’l orG. 379 (1999); alexander WendT, soCial Theory of inTernaTional poliTiCs 
(1999).
  4. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, 52 inT’l orG. 887, 902–04 (1998). Curiously, Finnemore and Sikkink overlook 
coercion and force as compliance generating mechanisms despite their recurrent use 
for this purpose. See Vaughn P. Shannon, Norms Are What States Make of Them: The 
Political Psychology of Norm Violation, 44 inT’l sTud. Q. 293, 297 (2000).
  5. See Paul Huth & Benjamin Valentino, Mass Killing of Civilians in Time of War, 1945–2000, 
in peaCe and ConfliCT 2008 (J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, & Ted Robert Gurr 
eds., 2008); Ekaterina Stepanova, Trends in Armed Conflicts: One-Sided Violence Against 
Civilians, in sipri yearbook 2009: armamenTs, disarmamenT and inTernaTional seCuriTy 39 
(2009). 
  6. This idea, and way of formulating it, is borrowed from niCholas J. Wheeler, savinG sTranG-
ers: humaniTarian inTervenTion in World poliTiCs (2000). It is based on Quentin Skinner, 
Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action, in meaninG and ConTexT: 
QuenTin skinner and his CriTiCs 97, 117 (James Tully ed., 1988).
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two “anti-civilian ideologies,” which provide normative grounds for killing 
civilians (described here as “military necessity” and “selective extermina-
tion”) or contest the facts of the case to portray behavior as consistent with 
civilian immunity.7 The struggle for civilian immunity is therefore partly a 
struggle between the norm itself and competing norms and partly a struggle 
over the interpretation of events. This is not the end of the matter though, 
because legitimation is an agential process and is therefore influenced by 
intervening variables. Understanding these variables and how their content 
and relative importance changes over time is as important as understand-
ing the ideational battle between civilian immunity and its competitors to 
understanding the legitimation of mass atrocities.
This article proceeds in five parts. The first examines the factors that might 
influence the legitimation of mass killing in the face of a norm proscribing 
such killing, focusing on the politics of legitimacy, the ideational contest 
between civilian immunity and its competitors, and important intervening 
variables. The remaining sections examine how these factors shaped the 
legitimation of mass killing in four historical periods—the long nineteenth 
century, the period around the Second World War, the Cold War and the 
post-Cold War era—focusing especially on changes in patterns of justifica-
tion and legitimation. From this, the article contends that civilian immunity 
has engaged in a protracted ideational struggle and has prevailed to some 
extent. At the same time, important changes in the operation of key inter-
vening variables have made it more difficult for perpetrators to legitimize 
mass killing. Most notably, improved reporting makes contesting the facts 
of the case less viable and the end of the Cold War removed significant 
countervailing concerns which reduced the chances of perpetrators being 
seen as more legitimate actors than other relevant actors and removed other 
key policy priorities which had previously served to limit condemnation 
and punishment. Nevertheless, despite its apparent ascendancy the norm 
remains vulnerable to ideational challenges—made evident by the War on 
Terror, which has pitted an ideology of selective extermination against liberal 
governments tempted to revert to necessity arguments to justify skirting the 
edges of civilian immunity. 
  7. The label “anti-civilian ideology” is taken from Hugo Slim and refers to political doctrines 
or ideas that hold that certain groups of civilians do not enjoy the protection of civilian 
immunity and provide reasons or justifications. See huGo slim, killinG Civilians: meThod, 
madness, and moraliTy in War (2008).
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II. ATRoCITIES, CIVILIAN IMMUNITY ANd THE STRUGGLE foR 
LEGITIMACY
Contemporary mass killing is often explained without reference to civilian 
immunity. It has been portrayed as, variously, a rational tool employed to 
accomplish radical social transformations or eliminate perceived enemies, 
a useful strategy for defeating certain types of insurgencies, a recourse for 
governments unable to prevail over their enemies with conventional military 
means, and (in the case of non-state actors) a product of the conditions in 
which groups originate.8 Where the norm is found to encourage actors to 
wage war more discriminately, it does so in tandem with other develop-
ments such as technological progress which permits those actors to conduct 
themselves more effectively and discriminately.9 The general implication here 
is that civilian immunity is too weak to inhibit behavior. 
But there are glimpses of civilian immunity at work in these studies. In 
particular, these accounts agree that perpetrators generally resort to mass 
killing only reluctantly and only when other strategies have proven ineffective 
or prohibitively expensive. More often than not, armed belligerents choose 
to not exterminate their enemies, even when they have the capacity to do 
so and stand to benefit.10 According to Alexander Downes and Benjamin 
Valentino, this is because potential perpetrators are concerned about the 
risk of retribution and third party intervention, which might be triggered by 
moral outrage against the atrocities.11 Fear of retribution is certainly evident in 
some cases—most notably Britain and Germany at the outset of the Second 
World War12—but is not a realistic fear in most cases, where significant im-
balances of power make it unlikely that victim groups could seriously harm 
their tormentors. In most cases, therefore, the reluctance to kill civilians as 
a first resort is explained by the fear that it will prove counter-productive 
owing to its illegitimacy. Potential perpetrators also sometimes worry that 
illegitimacy will undermine domestic support and elite cohesion.13 
  8. Respectively, benJamin a. valenTino, final soluTions: mass killinG and GenoCide in The TWenTieTh 
CenTury, chs. 3, 4 (2004); Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth & Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “Drain-
ing the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare, 58 inT’l orG. 375 (2004); alexander b. 
doWnes, TarGeTinG Civilians in War (2008); Jeremy m. WeinsTein, inside rebellion: The poliTiCs 
of insurGenT violenCe (2007).
  9. Thomas, supra note 3.
 10. daniel ChiroT & Clark mCCauley, Why noT kill Them all? The loGiC and prevenTion of mass 
poliTiCal murder (2006).
 11. valenTino, supra note 8; doWnes, supra note 8.
 12. Jeffrey W. leGro, CooperaTion under fire: The ConduCT of The air War in The seCond World 
War (1992).
 13. This was particularly evident in Britain and the US during the Second World War. Both 
governments refused to acknowledge their strategy of bombing city centers because they 
feared that such an admission would undermine support for the war. See max hasTinGs, 
bomber Command 172–73 (1979); sahr ConWay-lanz, CollaTeral damaGe: ameriCans, non-
CombaTanT immuniTy, and aTroCiTy afTer World War ii 10–11 (2006).
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To explain the factors that determine the capacity of civilian immunity to 
inhibit behavior, therefore, we need to understand the politics of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy refers to recognition of the rightfulness of an actor or behavior 
and is judged in relation to relevant norms.14 An action is legitimate to the 
extent that it is justified in terms of shared norms and those justifications 
are validated by others.15 As a rule of thumb, the greater the extent of the 
validation, the more legitimate an action can be and vice-versa. This social 
element means that acts are seldom either wholly legitimate or illegitimate. 
Thus, it is more accurate to speak of degrees of legitimacy. When actors 
proffer justifications for their behavior, different audiences weigh the claims 
and act based on their judgments of legitimacy.16 Societies generally have 
multiple—sometimes contradictory—norms, meaning that actors may employ 
one norm in order to justify behavior that violates another or argue about 
how to apply the norm or which norm ought to be prioritized.17 Moreover, 
because legitimation is a social process, it is open to competing interpreta-
tions of how relevant norms apply to particular cases and the facts of the 
case at hand. 
Seeking legitimacy, actors communicate claims or arguments in order 
to explain and justify their actions. Claims and arguments typically assert 
either that a particular norm ought to be applied in a particular situation 
or that new normative beliefs ought to be developed and translated into 
norms.18 These claims and arguments are evaluated by relevant audiences 
on the basis of their shared expectations of appropriate behavior as well as 
political and prudential calculations. What is considered legitimate depends 
on claims, arguments and judgments that represent a balance of different 
norms and political calculations.19 
Norms are not simply guides to how we must act, but are constituted 
and governed by the community. As such, actors are not entirely free to 
select whatever argument they like because interpretations of a norm are 
monitored by the community as a whole.20 The purpose of making justificatory 
 14. Hurd, supra note 3, at 381. In a similar vein, Thomas Franck argues that legitimacy is the 
property of a rule that exerts a compliance pull, Thomas franCk, The poWer of leGiTimaCy 
amonG naTions 24 (1990).
 15. From this perspective, legitimacy is a social fact built on consent that is meaningful only 
to the members of the community that accepts it. Ian Clark, Legitimacy in a Global 
Order, 29 rev. inT’l sTud. 75, 80 (2003).
 16. Thomas franCk, reCourse To forCe: sTaTe aCTion aGainsT ThreaTs and armed aTTaCks 185 (2002).
 17. As Finnemore points out, “determining which rules and norms apply in different situ-
ations involves sophisticated reasoning processes.” marTha finnemore, naTional inTeresTs 
and inTernaTional soCieTy 29 (1996).
 18. See neTa C. CraWford, arGumenT and ChanGe in World poliTiCs: eThiCs, deColonizaTion and 
humaniTarian inTervenTion 24 (2002).
 19. ian Clark, leGiTimaCy in inTernaTional soCieTy 207 (2005).
 20. ludWiG WiTTGensTein, philosophiCal invesTiGaTions ¶¶151, 185 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 
1953).
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arguments in the first place is to persuade others about the legitimacy of a 
course of action and implausible arguments are unlikely to be persuasive.21 
Therefore, as Quentin Skinner argued, actors “cannot hope to stretch the 
application of the existing principles indefinitely; correspondingly, [the ac-
tor] can only hope to legitimate a restricted range of actions.”22 If Skinner is 
correct, there is a limited range of arguments that an actor (even a powerful 
one) can use to legitimize the commission of mass atrocities. Thus, while 
there will be contestation about the appropriate interpretation of norms and 
events, actors cannot put forth wholly self-serving and idiosyncratic justifica-
tions in every case.23 If plausible arguments are not available, then a course 
of action will be inhibited because it cannot be legitimated. Of course, as I 
noted earlier, a powerful actor may pursue the course of action anyway, on 
the grounds that its material power makes it able to withstand the material 
and reputational costs of illegitimacy. But even powerful actors have limits 
on the costs that they can tolerate and history is littered with examples of 
illegitimacy imposing unbearably high costs on the powerful.
There are three basic ways of legitimizing action that may be thought to 
violate a particular ethical norm (such as civilian immunity). The first is to 
appeal to other norms. Norms are inconsistent, sometimes contradictory, and 
do not share ethical content.24 Nor is there a ready-made hierarchy of norms. 
Where hierarchies emerge, it is usually through processes of contestation 
and legitimation. Earlier, I argued that in modern times, two sets of norms, 
labeled “anti-civilian ideologies,” have been used to justify the intentional 
killing of civilians. The first is the principle of military necessity. This principle 
holds that in certain circumstances, actors may legitimately target civilians 
when it is necessary. For the norm to legitimize mass atrocities the actor in 
question must be considered a legitimate authority and its purpose must also 
be seen as legitimate. Audiences will also expect perpetrators to demonstrate 
necessity—in other words, that there is no other plausible way of achieving 
that legitimate goal. The military necessity argument was most commonly 
 21. finnemore, supra note 17, at 141.
 22. Skinner, supra note 6, at 117.
 23. edWard halleTT Carr, The TWenTy years’ Crisis 1919–1939: an inTroduCTion To The sTudy of 
inTernaTional relaTions 92 (1946).
 24. As Martha Finnemore has argued: 
To understand how norms work, we need to understand the complexity, contradictions and 
indeterminacy of the larger normative system in which political action takes place. Any policy 
decision of consequence is taken within a dense web of normative claims that often conflict with 
one another. . . . After all, if the prescriptions of norms and values were always clear or if they 
never conflicted with one another, we would not have to make any decisions; we would just 
follow the prescriptions.
   Martha Finnemore, Paradoxes in Humanitarian Intervention, in moral limiT and possibiliTy 
in World poliTiCs 197, 198 (Richard Price ed., 2008).
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used to justify the killing of civilians in counter-insurgency warfare in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but also the bombardment of cities 
in high attrition wars and by non-state actors to justify terrorism. The second 
anti-civilian ideology, I label selective extermination. This ideology holds that 
certain classes of civilians do not enjoy the protection of civilian immunity 
and can therefore be legitimately killed. Selective extermination had its ori-
gins in Western imperialism, which drew sharp racial distinctions between 
civilians deserving protection (i.e. Europeans) and those not so deserving 
(i.e. non-Europeans). The logic of this imperialist ideology underpinned the 
totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century that removed whole races 
(Fascism) and socioeconomic classes (Communism) from the protection 
of civilian immunity, and is evident today in extreme Islamism and many 
localized nationalist ideologies. I call it “selective” extermination because 
it identifies specific groups as outside the protection of civilian immunity 
rather than rejecting civilian immunity as a whole. Selective extermination 
ideologies never have universal appeal, as they divide human society into 
either two (the “in group” and “out group”) or three (in group, “bystanders,” 
out group) groups and do not make appeals to out groups and bystanders. 
At most, these ideologies tend to be internalized and enjoy strong validation 
within their host community but tend not to be considered a plausible justi-
fication for mass killing outside that community. Indeed they are structurally 
opposed to universalism and thus make no universalist claims to legitimacy.
The second strategy is to contest the facts of the case in order to deny 
that the norm is being violated.25 Actors may simply deny that they are 
deliberately targeting civilians. Given conditions that make it difficult to 
distinguish combatant from non-combatant (as in urban war or counter-
insurgency) or that make external scrutiny difficult, or a context where the 
interests of powerful external actors are served by turning a blind eye and 
there is sufficient scope to contest the accuracy of reported violations, ac-
tors may argue that they are not intentionally killing civilians or may deny 
that civilians are being killed at all. These arguments provide counter-factual 
validity to the principle of civilian immunity. The reluctance to be truthful 
demonstrates a degree of deference to the norm and fear that open viola-
tion may prove costly. Actors making this argument may be required to go 
to some lengths to cover-up evidence of atrocities and make it appear as 
if they were complying with the principle. Often, actors employing denial 
modify their behavior in order to reduce the appearance of norm violation. 
This may include (but is not limited to) prosecuting a handful of low-ranking 
perpetrators to sustain the argument that mass killing was perpetrated by 
 25. An approach identified in a different context by Michael Byers, Pre-Emptive Self-Defense: 
Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change, 11 J. pol. phil. 171 (2003).
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“rogue elements” and not as a matter of policy, limiting the commission of 
atrocities to regions less likely to attract international media attention, and 
offering humanitarian assistance to the survivors.
A third potential strategy is to contest the substance of the norm itself and 
propose new norms. This option is usually open only to the most powerful 
and even then is only viable when the society exhibits dissatisfaction with 
the existing norm.26 Given the depth of the overlapping moral consensus 
about civilian immunity the third strategy is not an option that is likely to 
have been available to actors in the modern era. 
Judgments about the legitimacy of a particular action are therefore 
influenced by the plausibility of their arguments relative to relevant shared 
norms. However, as I argued in the introduction, both the judgments and 
the consequences that flow from them are heavily mediated by intervening 
variables.27 Intervening variables mediate the way in which justifications are 
articulated, the manner in which they are judged, and the costs and pay-
offs associated with particular courses of action. They influence the extent 
to which justificatory arguments are validated or rejected and increase or 
reduce the likelihood that norm violation will be met with condemnation 
and punishment. 
This article identifies three significant intervening variables which im-
pact upon the legitimation of mass atrocities—but this is not a definitive 
list of variables nor is it necessarily transferable to other sectors or norms. 
First is the extent of agreement about the facts of the case and availability 
of reliable information. In evaluating the extent to which the perpetrator’s 
action corresponds with shared norms and the plausibility of its justificatory 
arguments, third parties have recourse only to the known facts at the time. 
Incomplete information grants perpetrators more latitude in the selection of 
plausible justificatory arguments, whereas more extensive reporting reduces 
the range of plausible justifications that are available, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of legitimation.28 
Second is the legitimacy of the actor that is perpetrating the mass killing 
relative to other relevant actors. Because identities are “inherently relational,” 
judgments about the legitimacy of an actor are never made in isolation of 
the social context.29 They are therefore relative. Actors and behaviors are 
judged to have more or less legitimacy and these judgments inform as-
sessments about the legitimacy of the behavior or actor relative to other 
 26. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 4, at 897.
 27. Intervening variables, Valentino argues, “may act to increase or decrease leaders’ incen-
tives or capabilities to launch mass killing and, consequently, the likelihood that mass 
killing will occur.” valenTino, supra note 8, at 69–71.
 28. See Gary J. bass, freedom’s baTTle: The oriGins of humaniTarian inTervenTion 25–38 (2008).
 29. On the relational nature of identity see Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make 
of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 inT’l orG. 391, 397 (1992).
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relevant behaviors and actors. Actors that are thought legitimate, or whose 
purposes are considered legitimate, are likely to succeed in legitimating 
norm violating behavior to a greater extent than actors whose legitimacy is 
already in doubt. Third parties that consider an actor and its purposes to be 
more legitimate than other relevant actors are predisposed towards accept-
ing that actor’s justifications. They are more likely to validate justifications 
for norm violating behavior, and may do so even if those justifications are 
not particularly plausible.30 
Third is the importance attached to the case at hand and the norm of 
civilian immunity, relative to other policy priorities. It is not only important 
to know whether or not an actor believes that a course of action violates 
a particular norm, we also need to know what significance is attached to 
that judgment. Actors may criticize violations of a norm but regard them as 
less important than other policy concerns, reducing the likelihood that the 
illegitimacy of an action will undermine the legitimacy of the perpetrator or 
that illegitimacy will produce punishments. Along with the relative legitimacy 
of the actor, this factor helps establish the sufficiency threshold. All else be-
ing equal, the higher the level of priority accorded by third parties to a case 
and to norm violating behavior, the higher the threshold of sufficiency for 
legitimacy. In addition to prior judgments about the actor’s legitimacy, the 
key determinants of policy priority include historical relations between the 
two entities, the geostrategic location of the event, the relationship between 
the perpetrator and great powers, and the degree of domestic agitation in 
favor or against the perpetrators. 
The process of legitimation mediated by intervening variables has a 
cumulative effect, altering the strength of the norm and the importance of 
individual intervening variables. When actors alter their behavior as a result 
of this process—for example, by not resorting to mass killing as a first op-
tion because of concerns about potential costs or by adopting a particular 
justificatory strategy (for instance, disputing the facts of the case rather than 
appealing to an alternative norm)—it can be said that they are “learning.”31 
There are many different types of, and ways to categorize, social learning 
but for our purposes it is useful to distinguish two: learning what works and 
learning what is appropriate. The first is instrumental learning: learning about 
the consequences of particular actions and the activities, postures and com-
municative actions likely to deliver desirable outcomes in given situations. 
Actors may learn instrumentally to make judgments about the expected costs 
 30. Richard K. Herrmann & Vaughn Shannon, Enacting International Norms: American Elite 
Thinking About Interests and Obligation, Paper presented at the 1999 Annual APSA 
Conference, Atlanta, GA.
 31. Jack S. Levy, Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield, 48 inT’l 
orG. 279 (1994).
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associated with mass atrocities, taking account of the relevant intervening 
variables. If expected costs are thought excessive, they are likely to choose 
norm-compliance. The second form of learning is socialization (or social 
learning). This refers to learning appropriate behavior for an actor with a given 
identity. Socialization is typically understood as a process of inducting new 
members into the ways of behaving that are expected by a community.32 As 
more actors are socialized and internalize the principle of civilian immunity, 
the balance between the principle and the “anti-civilian ideologies” shifts, 
making it more difficult to employ the latter to justify breaches of the former 
and pushing perpetrators towards other justificatory strategies.
From this discussion, we can derive five basic propositions, which will 
guide the remainder of the article. They are:
1. Actors prefer to legitimize their behavior and will be inhibited from 
acting in ways that cannot be legitimized by shared norms. Shared 
norms constrain behavior either by making compliance habitual 
(embedded or internalized norms) or by influencing others to im-
pose reputational or material costs on actors that fail to comply with 
shared standards of behavior, thereby altering the anticipated costs 
and benefits associated with mass killing. 
2. To legitimize their behavior, perpetrators will typically invoke either 
an anti-civilian ideology to justify violating the principle of civilian 
immunity or will contest the facts of the case and deny they are 
violating the principle.
3. The process of legitimation is mediated by two sets of factors: (1) 
the relative weight given to civilian immunity and the anti-civilian 
ideologies; (2) intervening variables. These factors determine both 
the level of legitimation and the consequences that flow from this. 
4. Judgments in individual cases have cumulative effects thanks to social 
learning. These cumulative effects alter the relative weight given to 
civilian immunity and the anti-civilian ideologies and influence the 
relevance of intervening variables. This is not a linear or teleological 
process and the weight of precedent can move either in support of, 
or against, the norm of civilian immunity.
5. To understand why mass killing persists in the face of the principle 
of civilian immunity we need to study this process of legitimation. 
 32. James f. barnes, marshall CarTer, & max J. skidmore, The World of poliTiCs: a ConCise in-
TroduCTion 38 (1980) cited in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, The 
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practices, in The poWer 
of human riGhTs 11 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999). 
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Using this framework, the remainder of the article examines the legitima-
tion of mass killing in four historical periods: the long nineteenth century 
when civilian immunity made the jump from widely held moral principle 
to shared ethical norm; the period around the Second World War when 
fascists and communists employed industrial scale mass killing and liberal 
states responded in part with their own mass atrocities; the Cold War period 
dominated by the violent struggle between communism and capitalism; and 
the post-Cold War era when the focus temporarily shifted to the collective 
enforcement of civilian immunity, only to be replaced by its potential wind-
ing back thanks to the emergence of a new totalitarian ideology (radical 
Islamism) and the return of “military necessity” arguments in relation to the 
“War on Terror.” 
III. THE LoNG NINETEENTH CENTURY (1789–1939)
This section examines the legitimacy of mass atrocities from the French 
Revolution to the late 1930s. Although there was no formal international 
legal prohibition on the killing of civilians during this period, this was the 
period in which the moral principle of civilian immunity began to be trans-
lated into a shared ethical norm.33 While recognizing that non-state actors 
also employed mass atrocities, this section focuses on the legitimacy of 
atrocities committed by states. 
During the long nineteenth century, state-based mass atrocities were 
justified by reference to the two anti-civilian ideologies described earlier. Typi-
cally, European powers justified the violent suppression of civilian protestors 
and counter-insurgency strategies that involved mass killing within Europe 
on necessity grounds and employed “selective extermination” arguments 
to justify mass atrocities in the non-European world.34 The legitimization of 
these justifications was shaped principally by a combination of their quality 
and two of the intervening variables described earlier. First, the legitimacy of 
the regime in question, measured in terms of its domestic and international 
standing and relative to other relevant actors. Second, judgments based 
on the known facts of the case about the extent to which mass atrocities 
were necessary for accomplishing the legitimate ends of that authority. The 
illegitimacy of killing civilians played only a secondary role, but one that 
grew with importance as the period unfolded and civilian immunity evolved 
 33. To borrow terminology used by Thomas, supra note 3, at 27–28.
 34. As Edward Keene argues, “the world was clearly divided in two for the purposes of 
international and political legal order: an order promoting toleration within Europe” 
and one violently enforcing a concept of “civilization” outside. edWard keene, beyond 
The anarChiCal soCieTy: GroTius, Colonialism and order in World poliTiCs 7 (2002).
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from an overlapping moral principle to a shared norm. The justification of 
mass atrocities by states was supported at the beginning of the period by a 
consensus that “uncivilized” non-European peoples (by dint of their race) and 
irregular combatants and their civilian supporters (by dint of their decision to 
wage or support an illegitimate form of warfare) did not enjoy the protections 
afforded by civilian immunity.35 Thus, racist doctrines associated with the 
colonists’ “civilizing mission” and conventions governing reprisals against 
irregular combatants and their supporters created a permissive normative 
environment that enabled and legitimized mass atrocities in these settings. 
The French Revolution marked the opening of a profound transformation 
of world politics away from an order founded on absolute monarchs and 
empires towards a society of sovereign states constituted, nominally at least, 
by the will of the their people. This transformation had a profound impact 
on the legitimization of mass killing and opened the door for activists like 
Henri Dunant to campaign that the moral principle of civilian immunity be 
translated into a shared norm.36 The social bases of government legitimacy 
began to change as authority claims based on the supposed “divine rights” 
of monarchs were challenged by the increasingly popular idea that political 
authority derived from the will of the people.37 This had a varied impact on 
the legitimization of mass atrocities. On the one hand, the doctrine of popu-
lar sovereignty made it theoretically possible for non-state actors to justify 
political violence against civilians by claiming authority derived from the will 
of the people, thus expanding the number of actors who could legitimize 
mass atrocities and increasing the overall threat to civilians.38 On the other 
hand, in some cases where a government was unable to suppress rebellion 
through the use of mass atrocities, doubt was cast on its right to rule that 
 35. On the denial of legal protection to uncivilized peoples see Elbridge Colby, How to 
Fight Savage Tribes, 21 am J. inT’l l. 279, 279–80 (1927). The idea that civilians could 
be punished for the illegal acts undertaken by guerrillas was widely acknowledged. See 
lassa opeenheim, inTernaTional laW: a TreaTise 63–67 (1912).
 36. A transformation described in detail by mlada bukovansky, leGiTimaCy and poWer poliTiCs: 
The ameriCan and frenCh revoluTions in inTernaTional poliTiCal CulTure (2002); ChrisTian reus-
smiT, The moral purpose of The sTaTe: CulTure, soCial idenTiTy, and insTiTuTional raTionaliTy in 
inTernaTional relaTions (1999). It is important to note that in this period “humanitarianism” 
usually only extended to whites; it was certainly not universal in scope.
 37. This claim was first stated in Europe by the French revolutionary government and was 
resoundingly rejected by Europe’s other powers, though the United States expressed 
sympathy for the French cause. This should not be surprising, as the French revolution 
sits at the very beginning of the transformation. See, e.g., bukovansky, supra note 36, at 
1–10; Theda skoCpol, sTaTes and soCial revoluTions: a ComparaTive analysis of franCe, russia, 
and China (1979); Charles Tilly, CoerCion, CapiTal, and european sTaTes, ad 990–1990 (1990); 
andreas osiander, The sTaTes sysTem of europe, 1640–1990: peaCemakinG and The CondiTions 
of inTernaTional sTabiliTy (1994). 
 38. This created something of a dilemma for nineteenth century liberals who were concerned 
that such violence might descend into mob rule. For a discussion see John skorupski, 
Why read mill Today? 70–74 (2006).
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particular territory. Sometimes, when external judgments about legitimacy 
and strategic interests aligned these doubts translated into punitive action 
against the state perpetrator, as is shown below. 
Another product of emergent liberalism was the codification of the laws 
of war. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions formalized the idea that 
military necessity could not be used as a justification for breaking the laws of 
war.39 In addition, through the so-called Martens principle, the Conventions 
insisted that non-combatants remained “under the protection” of the “laws of 
humanity, and the requirements of public conscience.”40 As a result, necessity 
came to be understood as both justification and constraint, a logic set out 
most clearly in Lincoln’s General Orders No. 100.41 While necessity could 
legitimize mass killing, therefore, it also imposed constraints—only killing 
that could be plausibly demonstrated to be necessary could be legitimized 
thus. This did not entirely preclude the use of necessity as a justification for 
mass atrocities by states because the Hague system permitted lawful repri-
sals (including against non-combatants) and applied only between mutually 
recognized belligerents.42 Nonetheless, these developments had three effects 
on the principle of necessity as a justification for mass atrocities by states. 
First, the threshold at which governments began to incur criticism for using 
mass atrocities was incrementally lowered. In other words, by the end of 
the period “necessity” arguments could be used to justify much less civilian 
destruction than they could at the beginning.43 Second, external criticism of 
mass atrocities increased, though intervening variables remained dominant 
in influencing decisions as to whether to punish perpetrators. Finally, by 
the end of the period, the relative legitimacy of the perpetrator and victim 
groups was an increasingly important consideration in framing judgments 
about the legitimacy of mass killing.
 39. It should be noted that the laws of war continued to permit reprisals against civilian 
populations in times of insurgency. This is discussed in greater detail below.
 40. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, 18 
Oct. 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539. See Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles 
of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 am. J. inT’l l. 78 (2000). Accord-
ing to Paul Weidenbaum, the Hague Convention rendered obsolete the old view that 
necessity could be used to justify illegal measures. Thus, “military necessity . . . cannot 
overrule the laws of warfare.” Paul Weidenbaum, Necessity in International Law, 24 
TransaCTions of The GroTius soCieTy 105, 129 (1938).
 41. The emergence of necessity’s constraining component is detailed in JudiTh Gardam, neCes-
siTy, proporTionaliTy and The use of forCe by sTaTes 4–8 (2004).
 42. Weidenbaum, supra note 41, at 130.
 43. This is typified by the sharp international criticism of German atrocities against civilians 
in Belgium in 1914 in contrast to the acknowledgement of France’s right to use reprisals 
against Spanish civilians a century earlier. See karma nabulsi, TradiTions of War: oCCupa-
Tion, resisTanCe, and The laW 29–30 (1999); Michael Howard, Temperamenta Belli: Can 
War be Controlled?, in resTrainTs on War: sTudies in The limiTaTion of armed ConfliCT 1, 
9–10 (Michael Howard ed., 1979); Nicoletta F. Gullace, Sexual Violence and Family 
Honor: British Propaganda and International Law during the First World War, 102 am. 
hisToriCal rev. 714, 733 (1997).
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In cases where the legitimacy of the government and the necessity of 
using mass atrocities were accepted, governments typically avoided inter-
national opprobrium. Thus, despite being at war with Napoleon, Britain 
recognized France’s right to kill Spanish civilians in reprisal for guerrilla 
attacks on the French army. Britain and other European powers welcomed 
the violent suppression of the 1848 insurrection in Paris by the Republican 
government, which involved the summary execution of 2,000 to 3,000 civil-
ians, and Germany supported Britain’s use of concentration camps during 
the Boer War.44 General Sherman’s use of “total war” tactics directed against 
the South’s civilian population during the US Civil War also attracted little 
international criticism, and was actually applauded by Prussia.45 Sometimes, 
the perception that violence against civilians exceeded a level necessary 
for the actor to achieve its legitimate purpose resulted in criticism. This was 
notable in the case of the fall of the Paris Commune in 1871, where the 
summary execution of 20–25,000 civilians by the French government drew 
sharp criticism from both Britain and Germany, forcing the government to 
adopt a more conciliatory line, and in the case of European responses to the 
use of reprisals against French civilians by Prussian forces during the Franco-
Prussian war which grew steadily more critical the longer they persisted.46 In 
these cases, it was not the killing of civilians per se that was faulted, but their 
excessive killing. This was taken to new heights by the Armenian genocide 
in 1915. The killing of between 800,000 and 1.2 million Armenians by the 
Turks in 1915 was resoundingly condemned from almost every quarter of 
international society between 1915 and 1920—the only notable exception 
was Turkey’s German ally, but not even Germany excused the killing.47 And 
although its right to govern Armenia was uncontested in 1915, the genocide 
helped build an international consensus against Turkish rule there.48 
Increasingly conditioned by the idea of popular sovereignty, judgments 
about a government’s entitlement to govern a particular territory also framed 
normative assessments about the degree of violence that could be justified 
 44. See nabulsi, supra note 43, at 30; JonaThan sperber, The european revoluTions, 1848–1851, 
at 266 (2005).
 45. ian f. W. beCkeTT, modern insurGenCies and CounTer-insurGenCies: Guerrillas and Their 
opponenTs sinCe 1750, at 31 (2001). What criticism there was tended to come from British 
conservatives who sympathised with the confederate cause. See Hugh Dubrulle, A 
Military Legacy of the Civil War: The British Inheritance, 49 Cold War hisT. 153 (2003). 
 46. On British responses see E.S. Beesly, Comparative Atrocity, in The enGlish defenCe of The 
Commune, 1871, at 93, 96 (Royden Harrison ed., 1971). On Prussian reactions see oTTo 
pflanze, bismarCk and The developmenT of Germany volume ii: The period of ConsolidaTion, 
1871–1880, at 296 (1990). On the French reaction and the government’s change of 
position see roberT Tombs, The War aGainsT paris 1871, at 185 (1981). 
 47. See peTer balakian, The burninG TiGris: The armenian GenoCide and ameriCa’s response 293–94 
(2004); Taner akçam, from empire To republiC: Turkish naTionalism and The armenian GenoCide 
72 (2004); donald bloxham, The GreaT Game of GenoCide: imperialism, naTionalism and The 
desTruCTion of The oTToman armenians 138 (2005).
 48. bloxham, supra note 47, at 138.
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by reference to necessity. The clearest example of this comes from com-
paring French and Austrian experiences in 1848. Although the Habsburg 
crackdown on Hungarian nationalists in 1848 was somewhat less bloody 
and indiscriminate than the French crackdown in the same year, it attracted 
higher levels of international concern and criticism primarily because its 
right to govern its multinational empire was more in doubt than the French 
government’s right to govern its national state.49
As I intimated earlier, this normative order applied only to the “European” 
world. The treatment of non-European colonized peoples was judged accord-
ing to a different, and much more lenient, set of conditions governed by the 
doctrine of the civilizing mission and ideology of selective extermination. 
Between 1789 and the Second World War, Western states waged almost 
perpetual war outside Europe, much of it against civilians. Fifty-eight full-
scale wars were waged outside Europe between 1807 and 1912 and force 
was used to suppress uprisings on many more occasions.50 Atrocities were 
used by the British to suppress opponents in southern Rhodesia, Uganda 
and India;51 by Leopold and the Belgians (1880–1907) to govern their 
factory-colony in the Congo, claiming up to 2 million lives; the Germans in 
Southwest Africa (1904), virtually exterminating the Herero; the Italians in 
Abyssinia (1935–1939) where some 250,000 Ethiopians were killed, many 
in summary mass killings and gas attacks;52 by the Dutch in Java;53 by the 
US in the Philippines (1899–1902) at the cost of some 200,000 lives;54 and 
in German East Africa (Tanzania).55 As noted earlier, this killing was justi-
fied on the basis of an ideology of selective extermination which held that 
 49. The US, for instance, dispatched a diplomatic mission to persuade the Austrians to end 
their oppression. See arThur James may, ConTemporary ameriCan opinion of The mid-CenTury 
revoluTions in CenTral europe 54 (1927).
 50. sandra halperin, War and soCial ChanGe in modern europe: The GreaT TransformaTion revisiTed 
6–7 (2003).
 51. See henry edWard Colvile, The land of nile sprinGs: beinG Chiefly an aCCounT of hoW We 
fouGhT kabareGa (1895); roberT piCkerinG ashe, ChroniCles of uGanda (2d ed. 1971); John 
beaTTie, bunyoro: an afriCan kinGdom (1960). 
 52. The Italian colonial minister imagined an “Ethiopia without Ethiopians.” enzo Traverso, 
oriGins of nazi violenCe 67 (Janet Lloyd trans., 1996). Graziani, the Italian viceroy in 
Ethiopia, adopted a policy of mass executions and deliberately gassed non-combatants 
in order to terrorize the population into submission. See anGelo del boCa, The eThiopian 
War 1935–1941, at 214 (P.D. Cummins trans., 1965). 
 53. The Dutch used mass executions, reprisals, forced starvation and ‘scorched earth’ to 
retain control in Java. See miChael adas, propheTs of rebellion: millenarian proTesT movemenTs 
aGainsT The european Colonial order 174–80 (1979).
 54. For the most detailed account see sTuarT CreiGhTon miller, “benevolenT assimilaTion”: The 
ameriCan ConQuesT of The philippines, 1899–1903 (1982). 
 55. During a tribal revolt in East Africa, German Captain Hassel gave orders for everyone 
suspected of disloyalty to be hanged from trees, Thomas pakenham, The sCramble for afriCa, 
1876–1912, at 620 (1997). In 1899, the German authorities near Kilimanjaro killed 2,000 
Africans who refused to pay a “hut tax.” hans WaGner, falsChe propheTen: Gouverneur von 
lieberT und seine presse (1900). 
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the norms of conduct between civilized peoples simply did not apply to 
relations with the “uncivilized.” Colonial atrocities were not often criticized 
by European governments, though they did attract the ire of some liberals 
and socialists.56 One notable exception was Leopold’s massive abuse of the 
Congolese in the late nineteenth century, which (eventually) drew sharp 
criticism and diplomatic pressure from Britain, and later from France and 
Germany, which forced Belgium to assume responsibility for the colony.57 
The legitimacy of the regime played a key role as well, however, and it is 
important that in this one case where mass killing produced international 
punishment of a colonial ruler, the abuse was committed under the authority 
of a private individual (Leopold II) rather than a European state.58 
IV. THE AGE of ToTALITARIANISM
The totalitarian governments that emerged in the early Twentieth Century 
built on this colonial legacy and typically justified mass killing by reference 
to ideologies of selective extermination, which removed entire nations, races 
or socioeconomic classes from the basic moral and legal protections afforded 
to humans during this period. The genocide and mass atrocities unleashed 
by Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany attempted to remold societ-
ies by annihilating class and racial enemies.59 Japanese militarism justified 
mass killing by reference to the idea that non-Japanese people were inferior 
and could not therefore claim moral or legal protection. All three of these 
forms of totalitarianism justified the mass killing of civilians by reference to 
the rationale of selective extermination that underpinned the legitimation of 
mass killing in the non-European colonies that preceded them.60 Totalitarian 
states developed this rationale into comprehensive ideologies that permit-
ted or required the extermination of entire social groups in order to mold 
new ways of life.61 These ideologies of selective extermination appealed 
only to the perpetrator’s own community and ideological sympathizers. 
 56. Other liberals supported it, however. See John sTuarT mill, ConsideraTions on represenTaTive 
GovernmenT 34–40 (1991). A good example of liberal and socialist opposition to mass 
killing is provided by domestic German responses to the Herero genocide. See horsT 
dreChsler, “leT us die fiGhTinG”: The sTruGGle of The herero and nama aGainsT German impe-
rialism (1884–1915) 151, 163–64 (1980). 
 57. adam hoChsChild, kinG leopold’s GhosT: a sTory of Greed, Terror, and heroism in Colonial 
afriCa (1998).
 58. marTin eWans, european aTroCiTy, afriCan CaTasTrophe: leopold ii, The ConGo free sTaTe and 
iTs afTermaTh 183–84 (2002).
 59. A common refrain amongst Nazi physicians especially. See henry friedlander, The oriGins 
of nazi GenoCide: from euThanasia To The final soluTion 52, 142 (1995). 
 60. The clear links between colonial and Nazi ideology are set out in enzo Traverso, supra 
note 52.
 61. riChard overy, The diCTaTors: hiTler’s Germany and sTalin’s russia 214 (2004).
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In other words, each had its own closed moral system that did not appeal 
to or require external validation. This also removed the limits imposed by 
the other anti-civilian ideology, necessity, meaning that neither necessity 
nor civilian immunity provided any constraint to totalitarian mass killing. 
However, although a perpetrator was able to legitimize mass killing within 
its own community, the closed nature of these ideologies limited the extent 
to which mass killing could be legitimized outside that community, with 
the result that each received widespread condemnation and opposition 
from those outside the perpetrators’ own community. Thus, although the 
colonial doctrine from which Nazism and Japanese nationalism especially 
drew from was widely held, very few actors outside the totalitarians’ own 
political or ideological community validated their justifications. Indeed, even 
some governments within the Axis orbit refused to cooperate with Hitler’s 
extermination of the Jews partly on moral grounds.62 For their part, liberal 
governments criticized and waged war at some point against all three of 
the major totalitarians, though in the 1930s and 1940s they set aside their 
qualms about Stalinism in order to unite against the fascists.
The normative picture is made more complex, however, by the fact that 
whilst condemning totalitarian mass killing as uncivilized and barbaric, the 
Western allies themselves adopted a strategy of intentional mass killing, in 
the form of the area bombing of German and Japanese cities in the Second 
World War.63 In his dissenting opinion at the Tokyo war crimes trial, Justice 
Pal argued that the clearest case of direct orders to commit “indiscriminate 
murder” might be found in “the decision coming from the allied powers 
to use the atom bomb.”64 A. C. Grayling recently put forth a similar view, 
describing Britain’s bombing of German cities a “moral crime” according to 
the standards enumerated by the allies to prosecute German and Japanese 
war criminals.65 There are still those, however, who believe that the bombing 
was “perfectly justified” or merely a consequence of the inevitable breakdown 
of the distinction between combatant and non-combatant in total war.66 
 62. Hitler was only able to transport Italian Jews to the death camps after Germany seized 
control of Italy, had to remove the Hungarian government by force in 1944 to achieve 
his ambitions.
 63. As Richard Overy cogently put it, “the most striking moral paradox of the war years was 
the willingness of ostensibly liberal states to engage in the deliberate killing of hundreds 
of thousands of enemy civilians from the air.” riChard overy, Why The allies Won 296 
(1995).
 64. r.b. pal, inTernaTional miliTary Tribunal for The far easT: dissenTienT JudGmenT 620–21 (1953). 
 65. a. C. GraylinG, amonG The dead CiTies: Was The allied bombinG of Civilians in WWii a neCes-
siTy or a Crime? (2006).
 66. The strategy was “perfectly justified” according to Robin Neillands, Facts and Myths 
about Bomber Harris, 146 rusi J. 69 (2001). The idea that the combatant/non-combatant 
distinction breaks down in total war is put forward by Melden E. Smith, Jr., The Strategic 
Bombing Debate: The Second World War and Vietnam, 12 J. ConTemp. hisT. 175, 184 
(1977).
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Between 300,000 to 600,000 German non-combatants and over 200,000 
Japanese non-combatants were killed by allied bombing during the Second 
World War.67 The strategies of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and US Army Air 
Corps (USAAF) in the European and Pacific theatres respectively followed a 
similar trajectory.68 At the outset of the war, both committed themselves to 
precision raids against military targets. A combination of inaccuracy, poor 
weather, high casualty rates, and strategic preferences persuaded the RAF 
(over Germany) and USAAF (over Japan) to adopt strategies of area bombing 
aimed at “de-housing” workers by creating huge firestorms in residential areas. 
For our purposes, there are two critically important aspects of the terror 
bombing experience. First, whilst politicians and publics worried about its 
legitimacy and some lobbied for international prohibition, among strate-
gists a consensus emerged that held area bombing to be the most effective 
means of utilizing strategic air power and morally preferable to the pro-
tracted slaughter of trench warfare. This consensus persisted well into the 
Cold War and informed strategic arguments in favor of area bombing and 
nuclear deterrence.69 Second, despite this, neither the British nor American 
government publicly justified the deliberate bombing of civilians, primarily 
because they believed that it could not be legitimized and that this failure 
would undermine support for the war. Instead, both governments disputed 
the facts of the case, arguing that civilian casualties were the unintended 
consequence of attacks on military and industrial targets.70 Although they 
made use of widespread and systematic use of intentional attacks on civil-
ians, allied governments believed that a combination of necessity and rightful 
authority alone were not enough to substantiate a case for legitimizing their 
actions. Political figures in Britain and the US believed that their domestic 
constituencies would not support arguments openly justifying the deliberate 
targeting of civilians.71 Polls taken during the war suggest that a majority of 
 67. See max hasTinGs, supra note 13, at 226–27; riChard b. frank, doWnfall: The end of The 
imperial Japanese empire 7 (1999).
 68. It is important to note that in the European theatre, the USAAF remained committed 
to precision bombing though in practice the inaccuracy of targeting meant that the US 
Airforce also rained bombs down on German cities. The US participated in the infamous 
attack on Dresden, for instance. For the purposes of this discussion, however, I will limit 
my comments to considering the RAF in Europe and the USAAF in Japan.
 69. This consensus persisted well after the Second World War. See Ward Thomas, Victory 
by Duress: Civilian Infrastructure as a Target in Air Campaigns, 15 seC. sTud. 1 (2006).
 70. See sTephen GarreTT, eThiCs and airpoWer in World War ii: The briTish bombinG of German 
CiTies 31 (1996); r. a. C. parker, sTruGGle for survival: hisTory of The seCond World War 
164 (1989); frank, supra note 67, at 67. This line of reasoning was also employed to 
justify the Atomic attacks on Japan. See sTephen harper, miraCle of deliveranCe: The Case 
for The bombinG of hiroshima and naGasaki 205 (1985).
 71. Richard Overy, Allied Bombing and the Destruction of German Cities, in a World aT 
ToTal War: Global ConfliCT and The poliTiCs of desTruCTion, 1937–1945, at 277, 290–91 
(Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, & Bernd Greiner eds. 2005); ConWay-lanz, supra note 
13, at 14.
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people in allied countries were prepared to accept terror bombing, at least 
partly because they were misled about the real nature of the campaigns. 
Once the war was over, however, public support for the air campaigns 
dwindled as the intent behind them became clearer.72 Although largely 
nascent during the war itself, throughout these debates it is possible to 
discern an emerging belief, vocalized by critics of the bombing, that states 
were not entitled to use deliberately kill civilians even if they believed it 
necessary to accomplish their justifiable ends. Such arguments, however, 
were confronted by the gravity of the threat and the apparent utility of terror 
bombing. Nonetheless, liberal states could not condemn others for intention-
ally killing civilians while simultaneously committing the same types of acts 
without creating profound contradictions. To avoid this, allied governments 
carefully maintained the moral distinction between wanton genocide and 
(unintended) collateral damage in their public discourse though not in their 
actual behavior. 
This duplicity suggests that liberal governments recognized that the delib-
erate killing of civilians could not be legitimized by reference to anti-civilian 
ideologies because of the normative strength of civilian immunity within 
liberal societies. These considerations also point towards the emergence 
of a paradox in liberal thinking on the issue: on the one hand, a belief in 
the necessity of terror bombing for defeating great evil and, on the other, a 
commitment to human rights and civilian immunity.73 This paradox helped 
to shape debates about aerial bombing and other forms of mass killing in 
the second half of the twentieth century. In the wake of the Second World 
War, the putative success of allied bombing created a strategic rationale for 
disregarding the principle of civilian immunity in future defense planning. 
On the other hand, however, Axis war crimes (and the Holocaust especially) 
created a powerful impetus for strengthening the protections of civilians. 
As one historian notes, “the killing of innocent civilians would become the 
international epitome of evil and symbolize the cruelty of an enemy that the 
Allies had sacrificed so much to defeat.”74 Throughout the next forty years, 
ever-greater progress was made towards the institutionalization of civilian 
immunity, yet the West in particular would be recurrently confronted with 
the tactical potential of killing civilians.
 72. miChael Walzer, JusT and unJusT Wars: a philosophiCal arGumenT WiTh hisToriCal illusTraTions 
325 (1977); Lewis Mumford, Atom Bomb, 2 air aff. 326 (1948); abraham John musTe, 
noT by miGhT: ChrisTianiTy, The Way To human deCenCy 5–17 (1947).
 73. Described as the “annihilation-restraint paradox” by Colin Krahl. See Colin H. Krahl, 
In the Crossfire or Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties and US Conduct in Iraq, 32 
inT’l seC. 7 (2007).
 74. ConWay-lanz, supra note 13, at 15.
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V. THE CoLd WAR
The immediate post-Second World War period saw the establishment of 
legal rules designed to protect civilians and reduce the likelihood of future 
genocides. While both major parties of the emerging Cold War divide com-
mitted themselves to these standards, there remained important countervailing 
concerns relating to strategic necessity that mitigated against compliance 
with the new rules. Within this context, the emerging normative consensus 
on civilian immunity sat uneasily with the prevailing belief in both blocs 
that governments must do whatever necessary to protect themselves from 
their ideological enemies. Although, with the fall of Stalin, the Soviet Union 
backed away from the use of atrocities to effect domestic social transforma-
tion, it continued to deliberately kill civilians when challenged overseas, 
as in Hungary in 1956 and Afghanistan after 1979. Moreover, Communist 
regimes in China and Cambodia especially (but also Vietnam and Ethiopia) 
adopted strategies similar in form—and effect—to Stalin’s selective exter-
mination strategy of the 1930s, maintaining much as Stalin had done, that, 
whether by dint of their identity, social status or the political activities of 
some of its members, entire groups constituted a threat to the people and 
placed themselves outside the protections afforded to civilians.75
For the West and its allies, two sets of norms—the principles of civil-
ian immunity and necessity—were in perpetual tension with one another. 
Very few actors in the West were prepared to reject humanitarian principles 
out of hand, but neither were they prepared to forgo the perceived utility 
associated with the deliberate killing of civilians in certain circumstances. 
As a result, atrocities were used or condoned in many different settings. 
The protagonists and their allies used deliberate attacks on the civilian 
population as a strategy of war. Most notably, in the Korean War (1950-
1953) the US and its allies deliberately bombed North Korean cities and 
killed civilian refugees.76 Similar tactics were later adopted in Indochina, 
especially in Cambodia and Laos.77 Western governments also tolerated, 
and sometimes endorsed and aided, atrocities committed by governments 
against their own citizens, usually in counter-insurgency warfare. The US 
actively supported the governments in El Salvador and Guatemala as they 
used civilian devastation as a strategy for defeating communist insurgents, 
 75. See valenTino, final soluTions, supra note 8, at ch. 4. 
 76. See Conrad C. Crane, ameriCan airpoWer sTraTeGy in korea, 1950–1953, at 23 (2000); 
paul f. fuTrell, The uniTed sTaTes air forCe in korea: 1950–1953 (1983); Charles J. hanley, 
sanG-hun Choe & marTha mendoza, The bridGe aT no Gun ri: a hidden niGhTmare from The 
korean War (2001).
 77. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 152; roberT a. pape, bombinG To Win: air poWer and CoerCion 
in War 174–210 (1996); GuenTer leWy, ameriCa in vieTnam (1978); arnold r. isaaCs, WiThouT 
honor: defeaT in vieTnam and Cambodia (1983), William shaWCross, sideshoW: kissinGer, nixon 
and The desTruCTion of Cambodia (1979); laos: War and revoluTion (Nina S. Adams & Alfred 
W. McCoy eds., 1970).
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at the cost of somewhere between 100,000 and 260,000 civilian lives.78 It 
also tolerated and cooperated with the rightist governments in Argentina and 
Chile as they suppressed communist movements by killing, torturing and 
kidnapping civilians, killing between 14,000–30,000 civilians. In addition, 
the West tolerated the killing of up to 600,000 civilians suspected of being 
communist by the Indonesian military and various military-backed groups 
in 1965–1966. Finally, the West failed to seriously criticize the killing of 
some two million civilians by the Communist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 
because although the Khmer Rouge were communist, they were viewed 
as a useful bulwark against the regional hegemony of communist Vietnam. 
After the Khmer Rouge was ousted from power by Vietnam, the US and UK 
provided political and military support to them.79 
The fact that atrocities were so widely used and condoned by the West 
does not mean that the new humanitarian rules were an irrelevance. In none 
of the cases recounted above were the perpetrators able to secure a high 
degree of legitimacy for their actions, and in each case mass killing attracted 
criticism. Indeed, the Cold War protagonists often invoked the principle of 
civilian immunity in a self-serving fashion to denounce their opponents. In 
addition, continuing the pattern set by the allies during the Second World 
War, the non-communist perpetrators refrained from justifying the killing of 
civilians and instead focused on disputing the facts of the case in order to 
claim that their behavior was consistent with the norm. Perpetrators typi-
cally argued that civilians were killed unintentionally and that their deaths 
were the unfortunate by-products of necessary attacks on legitimate military 
targets. When facing communist insurgencies that made discriminating 
between soldiers and civilians difficult, they employed various techniques 
(issuing warnings, removing populations, declaring “free fire zones” or “red 
zones”) to collapse the distinction allowing them to maintain that everyone 
in a given area at a particular time could be classified as a combatant and 
therefore be legitimately killed in a fashion consistent with civilian immunity. 
Another common tactic was simply to deny that atrocities had occurred. 
The various strategies used to achieve these effects included collapsing the 
distinction between non-combatants and combatants by establishing “free 
fire/red zones” and issuing warnings, subcontracting the killing out to non-
state actors, misleading the public and sometimes even legislators about the 
nature and even the location of armed attacks, creating convoluted rules 
of engagement and targeting procedures, blaming “rogue elements” for the 
killing and issuing token punishments, questioning the reliability of reports 
 78. viCToria sanford, buried seCreTs: TruTh and human riGhTs in GuaTemala 14 (2003); roberT 
armsTronG & JaneT shenk, el salvador: The faCe of revoluTion 195 (1982).
 79. See Ben Kiernan, Introduction, in GenoCide and demoCraCy in Cambodia: The khmer rouGe, 
The uniTed naTions and The inTernaTional CommuniTy 10–11 (Ben Kiernan ed., 1993); George 
Chigas, The Politics of Defining Justice After the Cambodian Genocide, 2 J. GenoCide 
res. 245, 247–48 (2000).
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by organizations such as the UN and OAS, rejecting reported massacres as 
communist propaganda, and blaming the communists for civilian deaths.80 
For example, during the Korean and Indochinese Wars, political and 
military leaders took a number of steps to accommodate the norm and 
create the appearance of compliance with it, but were prepared to tolerate 
the killing of large numbers of civilians if necessary. In these cases, concern 
about civilian casualties played a limited role in the key decision-making 
moments. Where necessity seemed to dictate the killing of civilians, this 
was generally privileged over compliance with civilian immunity. In prac-
tice, therefore, there were often only limited efforts to avoid the killing of 
civilians, especially in Korea, Cambodia and Laos. Where restraints were 
introduced these were primarily intended to avoid domestic and international 
opprobrium and secure external legitimacy and was not habitual behavior 
consistent with an embedded norm. Thus, American decision-makers and 
strategists took greater care to avoid civilian casualties in Vietnam than in 
North Korea or Cambodia not because they were themselves convinced by 
the triumph of civilian immunity over military necessity but because domestic, 
international and world societies were starting to exhibit greater sensitivity 
to the protection of civilians—to the extent that judgments about the legiti-
macy of wars conducted by states were, for the first time, guided primarily 
by judgments about compliance with the norm of civilian immunity.81 This 
factor was more of an issue in Vietnam than in Korea or Cambodia because 
the international media attention shined a spotlight on civilian casualties 
there in sharp contrast to the very limited reporting of such casualties in the 
other two cases. The steady spread of global communications made denial 
less plausible as the Cold War progressed, increasing the legitimacy costs 
associated with the commission of atrocities.82 Thus the reporting of civilian 
deaths in Vietnam created serious legitimacy problems and forced US lead-
ers to pay more attention to civilian immunity but because the norm was 
not internalized, they continued to employ justificatory strategies (such as 
collapsing the civilian-soldier distinction in free fire zones) that subverted 
the norm’s intention. The role of information dissemination can be seen by 
comparing contemporaneous aerial strategies over North Vietnam which 
was relatively well covered by the world’s media, making denial implausible 
 80. See William v. o’brien, The ConduCT of JusT and limiTed War 99 (1981); Fred Branfman, 
Presidential War in Laos, 1964–1970, in laos: War and revoluTion 213 (Nina S. Adams 
&Alfred W. McCoy eds., 1970); armsTronG & shenk, supra note 78, at 153–54; mark 
danner, The massaCre aT el mozoTe: a parable of The Cold War (1994).
 81. American diplomats expended significant energy reassuring European governments 
about the direction of the air war. kim mCQuaid, The anxious years: ameriCa in The vieTnam-
WaTerGaTe era 72 (1989). See also leWy, supra note 77, at 400.
 82. On the role of the media in alerting the world to atrocities and thereby strengthening 
non-combatant immunity see Gary J. bass, freedom’s baTTle: The oriGins of humaniTarian 
inTervenTion 25–38 (2008).
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and forcing the US to discriminate between military and civilian targets, 
and aerial strategy over Laos and Cambodia, which were much less well 
covered by the media, more susceptible to plausible denial, and therefore 
open to largely indiscriminate bombardment.83
When perpetrators adopt a strategy of denial and argue that their behavior 
is consistent with the norm rather than invoking an anti-civilian ideology 
to override the norm, the intervening variables play a significant role in 
determining legitimation and the costs associated with illegitimacy. As such, 
the availability of accurate and timely information, the relative legitimacy 
of relevant actors, and the presence of countervailing policy concerns often 
coalesced to ensure that simple denial and obfuscation about the facts pro-
tected the perpetrator from perceived illegitimacy and punishment. Of these, 
the supply of information was particularly crucial. Where it was anticipated 
that attacks on civilians would be widely reported, potential perpetrators 
were inhibited from proceeding and encouraged to impose restraints on their 
behavior. But where it was expected that the flow of information could be 
controlled, civilian immunity imposed few constraints. In some cases, most 
notably Guatemala and El Salvador, the gradual accumulation of information 
brought pressure to bear over time on the perpetrators and their supporters. 
In stark contrast to the Western experience during the Cold War, there 
is little evidence to suggest that the communist world confronted a ten-
sion between fidelity to civilian immunity and the belief that it might be 
sometimes necessary to deliberately kill civilians. Between 1945 and 1989, 
communist regimes massacred literally millions of civilians. A conservative 
estimate puts the total number of civilians deliberately killed by communists 
after the Second World War between 6.7 million and 15.5 million people, 
with the true figure probably much higher. Communist governments in China 
and Cambodia embarked on programs of radical social transformation and 
killed, tortured or allowed to starve whole groups that were thought hostile to 
change or simply unworthy of life. In the Soviet Union, Albania, North Korea, 
East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and China, 
communist governments used sometimes massive levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians to deter and defeat actual and imagined opponents 
and/or exact revenge for the Second World War. Where communist govern-
ments were violently challenged, they exhibited little concern for civilian 
immunity, as evidenced by the Soviet assaults on Hungary and Afghanistan 
and North Korea’s conduct in the Korean War. Finally, communism spawned 
violent non-state actors, such as the Red Brigades and Bader-Meinhoffer 
gang in Europe, Shining Path in Peru, and FARC in Colombia, all of which 
deliberately targeted non-combatants. 
 83. See shaWCross, supra note 77.
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But it is not simply the number of victims that distinguishes communist 
from non-communist mass killing in the Cold War—though that in itself is 
important to acknowledge. The most important difference for our purposes 
lies in the fact that amongst the perpetrators and their supporters there was 
very little recognition that the deliberate extermination of large numbers of 
civilians might be morally problematic, let alone prohibited. Where there 
was criticism of this litany of mass murder, it almost always came from 
outside the communist world.84 The principal reason for the failure of civil-
ian immunity to moderate the behavior of communist governments during 
the Cold War was the persistence and spread of communism’s ideology of 
selective extermination, and its general acceptance within the communist 
world as a legitimator of mass killing. As I argued earlier, this “anti-civilian 
ideology” identifies whole groups as being outside the protection of non-
combatant immunity and therefore liable for legitimate extermination. The 
basic communist variant of this ideology was first developed and applied 
by Stalin and held that certain socioeconomic or national groups or politi-
cal attitudes were anti-communist and that group members were “enemies 
of the people” who could be legitimately destroyed. Although each of the 
communist regimes that massacred large numbers of civilians during the Cold 
War developed their own distinctive account of selective extermination, they 
all shared the basic idea that their targets—identified as whole groups—had 
by their identity, actions, or thoughts, placed themselves outside legal or 
moral protection.85 Thus, in contrast to most Western or anti-communist 
perpetrators of mass atrocities during the Cold War, communist perpetra-
tors tended to argue that their victims were “criminals” or “enemies of the 
people” and therefore beyond the protection of civilian immunity. These 
regimes devoted little energy to satisfying civilian immunity’s justificatory 
requirements. In some such cases, the justifications they offered were pure 
farce. Most notable, perhaps, was the Khmer Rouge submission to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights which claimed that most employees of the 
 84. One notable exception being Vietnamese criticism of the Khmer Rouge, but this was 
only stepped up immediately prior to and after Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia. 
Despite good knowledge of Khmer Rouge atrocities, between 1975 to1977, Vietnam 
tended to defend the Khmer Rouge regime. This is discussed in greater detail below.
 85. In relation to China see Xiaoxia Gong, The Logic of Repressive Collective Action: A 
Case Study of Violence in the Cultural Revolution, in The Chinese CulTural revoluTion 
reConsidered: beyond purGe and holoCausT 113, 120–21 (Kam-yee Law ed., 2003); lynn 
T. WhiTe iii, poliCies of Chaos: The orGanizaTional Causes of violenCe in China’s CulTural 
revoluTion (1989); Philip C. C. Huang, Rural Class Struggle in the Chinese Revolution: 
Representational and Objective Realities from the Land Reform to the Cultural Revolu-
tion, 21 modern China 105, 121 (1995); Yang Su, Mass Killing in the Cultural Revolution: 
A Study of Three Provinces, in The Chinese CulTural revoluTion as hisTory 96 (Joseph W. 
Easherwick, Paul G. Pickowicz, & Andrew G. Walder eds., 2006). On Cambodia, see 
karl d. JaCkson, Cambodia 1975–1978: rendezvous WiTh deaTh 235 (1989); Ben Kiernan, 
Myth, Nationalism and Genocide, 3 J. GenoCide res. 187, 193–94 (2001).
2012 Massacres and Morality 951
pre-communist government “support the regime” and “are also pleased 
to have participated in the construction of the new society.”86 By the time 
this document was submitted (June 1978), most employees of the former 
government were already dead. 
As I argued earlier, selective extermination arguments cannot be le-
gitimized outside the political community in which they operate and are 
therefore dependent on a combination of exogenous factors (such as the 
material power of their hosts, intervening variables etc.) for their survival. As 
a result, towards the end of the Cold War period—when the crumbling of 
communist power made regimes more vulnerable to, or reliant on, influences 
outside the communist world—some (though not all) communist regimes 
shifted from outwardly espousing selective extermination to strategies of 
denial similar to those utilized by the West. For example, to justify brutal 
reprisals against Afghan civilians, the Soviet Union collapsed the distinc-
tion between combatants and civilians in much the same way as the US 
had done in relation to Indochina. Likewise, in 1989 China simply denied 
that its forces had massacred students on Tiananmen Square as reported in 
the Western media.87 This was quite true—few, if any, students died on the 
square, but hundreds of protesters were killed in its environs, especially at 
Muxidi.88 Neither proved successful, largely because their implausibility 
was exposed by the dissemination of accurate information. The Soviet war 
in Afghanistan drew annual criticism from the UN General Assembly, its 
atrocities were exposed and criticized by the UN Human Rights Commis-
sion’s Special Rapporteur, and its mujahedeen opponents secured significant 
foreign aid from the US and the Muslim world. Chinese denials were rebut-
ted by evidence provided by the global media and the communist regime 
was punished by US, European, and Japanese sanctions.89 Since the end of 
the Cold War the remaining communist regimes have been no more likely 
to commit mass atrocities than non-communists, suggesting that the demise 
 86. Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of 
the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and 
Territories, Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-
Comm’n on Prev. of Discrim. & Protect. of Min., 35th Sess., 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1295, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/418 (1978).
 87. CraiG Calhoun, neiTher Gods nor emperors: sTudenTs and The sTruGGle for demoCraCy in China 
140–41 (1994).
 88. riChard baum, buryinG mao: Chinese poliTiCs in The aGe of denG xiaopinG 292 (1994). This 
line of argument was given succor by the publication of accounts that claimed that 
students were gunned down in the square. One account even goes as far as to argue 
that certain groups of students elected to say on the square and were summarily killed. 
There is no evidence at all to support this account, and the basing condemnation of 
China on the claim that students were massacred in the square only assists the Chinese 
government. For one such example, see James C. f. WanG, ConTemporary Chinese poliTiCs: 
an inTroduCTion 30–31 (2002).
 89. Documented in rosemary fooT, riGhTs beyond borders: The Global CommuniTy and The 
sTruGGle over human riGhTs in China (2000).
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of the communist bloc took with it their ideology of selective extermination 
and left their denial strategies just as exposed as the West’s by the prolifera-
tion of global media and reporting.
VI. AfTER THE CoLd WAR
The end of European imperialism brought an end to the colonial doctrine 
of selective extermination. The defeat of Germany and Japan in the Second 
World War closed the book on fascist selective extermination. The end of the 
Cold War helped persuade the world’s remaining communist governments 
to shift away from the communist doctrine of selective extermination first 
developed and practiced by Stalin. In the immediate post-Cold War period 
one might have been forgiven for thinking that civilian immunity had finally 
triumphed over the major doctrines of selective extermination. While new 
episodes of mass killing continued to emerge, there was little question of 
these cases avoiding international opprobrium as so many had done during 
the Cold War. Debates now turned on the questions about the facts of the 
case and what measures international society should adopt to halt the kill-
ing, protect the victims, and punish the perpetrators.90 Nor were strategies 
of denial successful. Although Rwandan genocidaires, Bosnian Serbs, and 
the government of Sudan were able to avoid international intervention to 
some extent by presenting the killing as part of complex tribal or civil wars 
in which all sides were culpable, this was a product more of international 
uncertainty about the most prudent courses of action, the lack of will to 
commit troops and resources, and disagreement about the relative weight 
of human rights and sovereignty norms, and not of doubts about whether 
the perpetrators were in fact deliberately killing civilians or the legitimacy of 
this.91 Even governments that opposed intervention generally recognized and 
criticized the intentional killing of civilians. After a number of false starts, 
international efforts gradually improved, testified by the steady reduction of 
both the number of new cases of mass killing and the average lethality of 
those cases, and the concomitant increase in the number of international 
missions dispatched to protect civilians.92 In short, continuing the trends 
evident towards the end of the Cold War, the 1990s seemed to suggest that 
civilian immunity had triumphed over the anti-civilian ideologies and that 
 90. It is especially the question of humanitarian intervention. See Wheeler, supra note 6.
 91. See miChael barneTT, eyeWiTness To a GenoCide: The uniTed naTions and rWanda (2003); James 
GoW, Triumph of The laCk of Will: inTernaTional diplomaCy and The yuGoslav War (1997); 
The inTernaTional poliTiCs of mass aTroCiTies: The Case of darfur (David R. Black & Paul D. 
Williams eds., 2010). 
 92. Erik Merlander, Magnus Oberg & Jonathan Hall, Are “New Wars” More Atrocious? 
Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the End of the 
Cold War, 15 eur. J. inT’l relaTions 505 (2009).
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at least two important intervening variables were now working in its favor: 
the dissemination of information made it easier to detect mass killing and 
the end of global strategic rivalry reduced the number and seriousness of 
countervailing policy concerns that had formerly reduced the degree to 
which civilian immunity was prioritized.
But it would have been premature to believe that no new doctrines of 
selective extermination would emerge to challenge civilian immunity. Indeed, 
one such doctrine—embedded in radical Islamism—was thriving in several 
parts of the world and was thrust to the fore of world politics on 11 Sep-
tember 2001.93 At its most basic, the doctrine holds that civilian immunity 
does not apply to non-believers or apostates (Muslims who do not follow the 
radicals’ interpretation of Islamic law) and that people in both groups may 
be legitimately killed either as collective punishment for perceived wrongs 
inflicted on the Muslim world or as a necessary part of war to establish the 
world Islamic state (caliphate). Like all such doctrines, the radical Islamist 
variant appeals only to members of a specific group, (mainly Sunni Muslims) 
and is therefore limited in the degree of global support it can plausibly hope 
to secure. The doctrine is hotly disputed within Islam itself. It is this relative 
lack of support, rather than any limitations on violence contained within 
the doctrine itself that explains why radical Islamism has thus far killed so 
many fewer people than colonialism, fascism and communism. 
Developing the ideas presented by earlier radical Islamist writers (prin-
cipally Mamduni, Faraj, al-Banna and Qutb), Al Qaeda declared a global 
jihad against the West, secular Muslim leaders, and others it considered 
to be apostate, whose ultimate aim is to establish the (ill-defined) Islamic 
state (caliphate).94 This jihad has principally targeted civilians. To justify this, 
Osama bin Laden, issued a fatwa making it a religious duty for Muslims to 
kill Americans and their allies, including civilians. This, in turn, was justified 
by a variety of arguments (e.g. the imposition of Islamic law by any means 
possible was God’s will, the intractable conflict between the dar al-Islam 
and dar al-Harb, the impossibility of coexistence, collective Western guilt for 
the oppression of Muslims and occupation of Muslim lands, the unlimited 
nature of jihad) that together comprised a doctrine of selective extermination 
containing all the main ingredients exhibited by earlier fascist, communist 
and imperial doctrines.95
As with earlier doctrines of selective extermination, Al Qaeda’s argu-
ments have little appeal for those outside the “in group.” It is not surprising 
therefore that they have been repeatedly and comprehensively denounced 
 93. See John l. esposiTo, unholy War: Terror in The name of islam 91 (2002).
 94. This chain of influence is noted by John kelsay, arGuinG The JusT War in islam 96 (2007).
 95. a. s. moussalli, moderaTe and radiCal islamiC fundamenTalism: The QuesT for moderniTy, 
leGiTimaCy and The islamiC sTaTe 154 (1999); riChard bonney, Jihad: from Qur’an To bin laden 
(2004).
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and subjected to severe international punishment, including the use of 
force.96 Within the Muslim world, however, Al Qaeda has proven more 
divisive. Whilst governments and religious leaders have tended to either 
condemn the organization or fault its religious reasoning, Al Qaeda has 
enjoyed a degree of popular support, particularly among disaffected youths 
in the Middle East, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and the West.97 This has 
proven sufficient to enable periodic terrorist attacks in the West and much 
more frequent attacks in Pakistan, as well as the insurgency in Afghanistan 
(which, admittedly, owes more to local factors), but insufficient to propel 
Islamic insurrections against established governments in the Muslim world 
(Arab Spring revolts were not Islamist in nature). As such, to date, the case 
of Al Qaeda provides “counterfactual validity” to the norm of civilian im-
munity and the claim that with the ending of the Cold War and communist 
China’s retreat from selective extermination, the norm is no longer seriously 
challenged by such doctrines. Although new doctrines may emerge, they 
are less likely to secure sufficient legitimacy for episodes of massive killing. 
But Al Qaeda and its doctrine of selective extermination is not the only 
challenge to civilian immunity to emerge from 9/11. Waging a war on Al 
Qaeda and its allies raises a set of particular dilemmas. Most notably, Al 
Qaeda operates in clandestine cells and its terrorists are indistinguishable 
from civilians most of the time. In Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and elsewhere 
Al Qaeda operatives, their allies and supporters concealed themselves 
 96. Beginning in 1999, the UN Security has unanimously passed several resolutions and 
presidential statements, condemning Al Qaeda, commending the use of force against it, 
and demanding that states cooperate in the fight against it. This consensus even survived 
the controversy over the US-led war in Iraq. As Boulden argued: 
The level of Council activity is significant, and has expanded across the issue area. All of this has 
occurred with a remarkable degree of consensus within the Council even while the drama of the 
divisive debate about Iraq and its aftermath has been carried out. The sustained unanimity that 
the Council has demonstrated on this issue speaks to the shared sense of threat that extends to all 
members of the Council, not just the Permanent Five. 
   Jane Boulden, The Council and Terrorism, in The uniTed naTions seCuriTy CounCil and 
War: The evoluTion of ThouGhT and praCTiCe sinCe 1945, at 608, 621 (Vaughn Lowe, Adam 
Roberts, Jennifer Welsh & Dominik Zaum eds., 2008). 
 97. It is difficult to know the precise level of support that Al Qaeda’s arguments have elicited 
in the Muslim world. One 2006 study points to a “recent survey” showing that “as much 
as 60 per cent of the population in some Arab countries” declared support for Osama 
Bin Laden—though without indicating which countries, when the survey was taken, 
or what questions were asked. More concretely, in November 2003 more than half of 
Saudis polled indicated support for Bin Laden’s message. There is also circumstantial 
evidence for the view that Al Qaeda secured significant support in the Muslim world. The 
radical Islamist message evidently garnered support among young Muslims, especially 
in the Middle East, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and some disaffected Muslims living in 
the West. It is also reported that in Nigeria, 70 percent of boys born in the months after 
9/11 were named “Osama”—though this finding is contradicted by other polls showing 
that over 70 percent of Nigerians support US counter-terrorism policies. See abdel bari 
aTWan, The seCreT hisTory of al Qaeda 40, 59 (2006); Leonard Weinberg, Democracy and 
Terrorism, in The rooTs of Terrorism 45, 52 (Louise Richardson ed., 2006).
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within the civilian population in an attempt to manipulate the moral and 
legal restraints observed by their enemies to further their cause.98 In these 
circumstances the tension between humanitarianism and necessity, evident 
in Western debates about the conduct of armed conflict during the Cold 
War, returned to the fore. The reasoning went thus: military targets are not 
easily identified; threats can emerge rapidly from ostensibly civilian sources. 
There are a large number of “dual use” technologies, actors, and buildings: 
box cutters can be harmless civilian tools or a critical piece of technology 
in turning a civilian aircraft into a weapon. In this environment it is much 
harder to distinguish combatant from non-combatant and the potential 
costs of failing to destroy combatants are high. In these conditions there is 
a strong temptation to place the protection of military forces and potential 
victims of future terrorism ahead of concerns for enemy non-combatants 
and to interpret the rules liberally to gain tactical advantage.99 
The Bush administration adopted a series of strategies (aerial bombard-
ment, torture of suspects, and some less than discriminate counter-insurgency 
actions such as the 2004 assaults on Fallujah) that prioritized perceived 
necessity over the protection of civilians. To justify this, it pointed to the 
gravity and uniqueness of the threat facing the US and its allies. It also laid 
the blame for civilian casualties squarely at the feet of Al Qaeda. According 
to US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “we did not start this war. So 
understand, responsibility for every single casualty in this war, whether they’re 
innocent Afghans or innocent Americans, rests at the feet of Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban.”100 I am certainly not arguing here that there is moral equivalence 
between these actions and Al Qaeda atrocities but even some War on Terror 
advocates concede that some of the strategies employed “skirt the edges” of 
law and restraint.101 Combined with the perceived illegitimacy of the 2003 
 98. This argument is presented by Michael Skerker, Just War Criteria and the New Face of 
War: Human Shields, Manufactured Martyrs, and Little Boys with Stones, 3 J. miliTary 
eThiCs 27, 27–31 (2004). It is endorsed by Michael Ignatieff, who during a lecture at the 
Canadian Royal Military College told his audience that “we are dealing with people who 
will systematically leverage your compliance with these rules of war into an advantage 
for their side.” Michael Ignatieff, Ethics and the New War, Canadian miliTary J., WinTer 
2001–2002, at 5, 7 (2001–2002).
 99. That this should be so was a view expressed by US military personnel during a workshop 
on collateral damage. See Carr CenTer for human riGhTs poliCy, undersTandinG CollaTeral 
damaGe Workshop (4–5 June, 2002), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/
Web%20Working%20Papers/WebJuneReport.pdf.
100. Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon Press Briefing (4 Dec. 2001), available at http://www.
defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2598. 
101. A point made, and justified by reference to the unique pressures of combating terrorism, 
by Jean Bethke Elshtain, Terrorism, in The priCe of peaCe: JusT War in The TWenTy-firsT CenTury 
118, 135 (Charles Reed & David Ryall eds., 2007).
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invasion of Iraq, the illegitimacy of some aspects of the way in which the 
War on Terror has been prosecuted helped strengthen hostility to the US.102 
By potentially weakening civilian immunity, these strategies helped Al 
Qaeda to legitimize its own doctrine by softening the grounds upon which it 
is condemned and contributing to anti-Americanism.103 The commission and 
validation of either Al Qaeda terrorism or US-led behaviors that are not wholly 
consistent with civilian immunity, makes it easier to commit and validate 
the other by weakening the principal normative inhibitor of both—the norm 
of civilian immunity. More troubling though, they demonstrate the frailty of 
non-combatant immunity as a restraint on human behavior and threaten to 
unravel decades of steady—if tortuous—progress towards a world society 
that unambiguously forbids mass atrocities. 
VII. CoNCLUSIoN
While there is a long-established overlapping moral consensus, which 
crystallized into a legal norm after the Second World War that prohibits 
the deliberate killing of civilians, not only has this practice persisted, but 
perpetrators have sometimes avoided punishment. The underlying reason for 
this is that legitimation is a social process. In the long-run, the norm of civil-
ian immunity has been engaged in two major contests—one direct and the 
other less so. The first was a contest between this norm and two competing 
sets of norms, or “anti-civilian ideologies,” military necessity and selective 
extermination. During the long nineteenth century, the principle of necessity, 
which initially enabled the killing of civilians especially as reprisals during 
counter-insurgencies, came to be associated with restraint as much as license, 
leading states to base legitimacy judgments on the extent to which they 
believed that killing of civilians to be “necessary.” What could be justified 
by reference to necessity reduced over time to the point where the use of 
reprisals by Germany in 1914 Belgium was widely condemned and provided 
a key component of the case for US intervention in World War I. Although 
necessity continued to influence political and military decision-making well 
102. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the percentage of people with a favorable 
view of the US in mainly Muslim Turkey fell from 52 percent in 2000 to 30 percent in 
2004. In Morocco it fell from 77 percent to 27 percent, in Pakistan from 23 percent 
to 21 percent, and in Jordan from 25 percent in 2002 to 5 percent. Although the Iraq 
invasion played a role in this, evidence suggests that it was US conduct as much as 
the invasion itself that triggered negative responses. For example, in July 2003, only 30 
percent of Iraqis favored the near-term withdrawal of coalition forces. By January 2005, 
after the Abu Ghraib scandal, that figure had jumped to 82 percent of Iraqis.
103. See Michael S. Stohl, Counterterrorism and Repression, in The rooT Causes of Terrorism 
57, 67 (Louise Richardson ed., 2006) (referring specifically to the propaganda value of 
the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses for Al Qaeda). 
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into the Cold War, it ceased to be part of the justificatory armor after 1914. 
In short, after 1914, military necessity was no longer seen as a legitimate 
excuse for killing civilians. It is therefore notable that necessity was not used 
to justify Allied aerial bombardment in the Second World War. Selective 
extermination has a longer, and altogether bloodier, history. Its modern roots 
lay in the colonial idea that the rules governing conduct between civilized 
people did not apply to the non-European world. This basic idea—that the 
rules do not apply to certain groups—was used by fascists and communists, 
and is used today by some Islamists—to justify the killing of civilians and 
extermination of entire groups. The weakness of this ideology, though, rests in 
its particularism. By dividing the world into hierarchically organized groups, 
selective extermination cannot legitimize mass killing beyond the in-group 
(e.g, Europeans, Aryans, Japanese, workers/peasants, Sunni Muslims who 
follow Shari’a). The colonial version died with empire, the fascist version 
was defeated in the Second World War, and the communist versions fell 
with the end of the Cold War. But as the persistence of petty nationalist or 
tribalist mass killing and the rise of radical Islamism demonstrates, new ac-
counts of selective extermination do emerge to challenge the universalism 
of civilian immunity. Though falling well short of justifying mass killing, the 
partial return of necessity-style arguments to defend practices that skirt the 
edges of the rules in the War on Terror, demonstrates that although civilian 
immunity might have triumphed over its ideational rivals this victory was 
relatively recent and remains fragile.
The second, indirect, struggle relates to the role of intervening con-
textual variables. Even where actors agree that a shared norm must not be 
violated, this does not necessarily translate into the automatic condemnation 
and punishment of violators. With the triumph of civilian immunity over 
its ideational rivals (first in the West, and then in the rest of the world at 
the end of the Cold War), perpetrators used a variety of strategies to claim 
that their norm-violating behavior was actually consistent with the norm. In 
these situations, the intervening variables played a major role in determining 
the extent of legitimation and it was changes in these variables rather than 
changes related to the norm or practices of mass suicide that produced the 
profound changes which began towards the end of the Cold War. All three 
intervening variables (information, relative legitimacy of the actors, policy 
priorities) were in evidence, influencing and shaping legitimation and the 
consequences that flowed from this. During the World War II, the absence 
of information about German civilian devastation assisted allied claims to 
not be targeting cities and civilians. During the Cold War, legitimation was 
more likely where information was scarcer and punishment was related to the 
relative legitimacy of the actors and relative policy priorities. As information 
improved and the recession of Cold War tensions removed countervailing 
policy priorities, it became more difficult to legitimize mass atrocities and 
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focus switched from legitimation to the nature of the punishment, and es-
pecially the question of armed intervention against perpetrators. Although 
intervening variables continued to influence the level of international pun-
ishment, they were much less able to prevent punishment per se or aid in 
the legitimation of mass killing.
What emerges from all this is that civilian immunity is both more recent 
and more fragile than might have been thought. Although it has asserted 
its predominance over anti-civilian ideologies, new ideologies emerge to 
challenge it. If in responding to that challenge, governments succumb to the 
temptation to privilege necessity over civilian immunity, the norm’s capacity 
to restrain behavior could recede very quickly.
